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Abstract
We analyze from an empirical point of view the evolution and determinants of Spanish 
regional public debt. Spain offers an interesting case study because of its high level of fi scal 
decentralization, implemented gradually during the past four decades, the parallel entry into 
force of a number of national fi scal rules in that period, and the heterogeneity of its regions, 
both in terms of economic fundamentals and some institutional features. Our main fi ndings 
are the following: i) regional governments’ fi scal policies reacted to public debt increases, 
on average, over the sample of study; ii) fi scal rules played a limited role in controlling debt 
surges, being only marginally effective in some instances, like high debt situations; iii) a 
higher degree of regional fi scal co-responsibility tends to be linked to more subdued debt 
dynamics; iv) market-disciple indicators have encouraged some discipline at the regional 
level, and v) regional non-standard (commercial) debt surges present explanatory power on 
the standard measure of public debt.
Keywords: regional public debt, fi scal rules, fi scal federalism, market discipline.
JEL classifi cation: H6, E62, C53.
Resumen
En este documento se hace un análisis empírico de la evolución y de los determinantes de 
la deuda de las Comunidades Autónomas (CCAA). España constituye un caso interesante 
de estudio debido a su alto nivel de descentralización fi scal (desarrollado gradualmente 
durante las últimas cuatro décadas), que se ha producido simultáneamente a la entrada en 
vigor de diversas reglas fi scales nacionales, así como por la heterogeneidad de sus CCAA, 
tanto en términos de su estructura económica como por la existencia de algunas diferencias 
institucionales. Los resultados principales del análisis son los siguientes: i) las políticas fi scales 
de las CCAA reaccionaron a los incrementos de la deuda pública, en promedio en el período 
analizado; ii) las reglas fi scales desempeñaron un papel limitado a la hora de controlar los 
incrementos de la deuda, siendo solo efectivas marginalmente en determinadas situaciones, 
(por ejemplo, en momentos en los que el endeudamiento fue más elevado); iii) un nivel  elevado 
de corresponsabilidad fi scal tiende a estar relacionado con una dinámica más moderada de 
la deuda; iv) los mercados fi nancieros parecen haber contribuido a disciplinar la conducción 
de la política fi scal de las CCAA, y v) los incrementos de la deuda comercial autonómica 
explican parte de la dinámica de la deuda autonómica medida de acuerdo con las defi niciones 
estándar (deuda según el Protocolo de Défi cit Excesivo).  
Palabras clave: deuda pública autonómica, reglas fi scales, federalismo fi scal, disciplina de 
mercado.
Códigos JEL: H6, E62, C53.
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1 Introduction
The analysis of sub-national public debt developments has gained relevance worldwide, due to
the rising share of sub-national finance in the overall financing needs of the General Government
sector in a number of countries, following a continued process of fiscal decentralization (Canuto
and Liu (2010), EC(2012)). Against this framework, we study in this paper the evolution and
the determinants of Spanish regional governments’ net financing needs (measured by the change in
public debt). We estimate empirical models in which we exploit the pool structure of our data (17
regions over the period 1995-2017).
The Spanish case is a relevant one from a global point of view, given that in the last few decades
a process took place in which a significant degree of fiscal devolution occurred, to heterogeneous
regions, in parallel with the adoption of several national and supranational fiscal rules, in different
waves. In this framework, in addition, Spanish regional governments have been traditionally very
active in capital markets, have accumulated significant levels of public debt, and are a recent exam-
ple of a situation of sub-central fiscal stress, including central government intervention, connected
to the euro area sovereign debt crisis. We develop in the following paragraphs these elements.
First, regional public finances were one of the major sources of national fiscal stress during
the recent economic and financial crisis. The lasting effect of the recent crisis over regional public
finances entailed a strong surge of regional debt over the last ten years, from some 6% of GDP in
2007 to 25% in 2017. The “Comunidades Auto´nomas” (CCAA henceforth) faced significant fiscal
stress during the core years of the crisis. As a result, financial markets were partially closed, and
the Central Government decided to bail-out a majority of regions.1 The CCAA debt crisis may
have damaged the sovereign risk of the country as a whole, as clearly stated by rating agencies in
the midst of the euro area sovereign debt crisis.2
1The Central Government reacted to these lack of liquidity of some CCAA creating two specific funds. The first
one, the Fund for Suppliers Payments, targeted the commercial debt of the regions that grew strongly up to 2011 both
in amount and in delay of payment. This Fund was key for enabling firms that provided services and goods to the
Public Administration to stay open and to continue investing and hiring new workers (Delgado-Te´llez et al. (2017)).
The second Fund, denominated the Financial Liquidity Fund, was established to cope with the liquidity problems of
the CCAA. Both Funds entailed a change in the ownership of the CCAA debt, from the private sector to the Central
Government. Thus, in 2017 around 58% of the debt of the CCAA was in hands of the Central Government.
2For example, as Fitch stated in its note “Liquidity for Spain Regions Positive, More Detail Needed” published
on March 20th 2012, the relevant measure of debt for Spain was not the Central Government’s one, but rather the
total debt of the General Government that includes the regional and local debt.
Second, the degree of fiscal decentralization in Spain is significant, and commensurate to that
of leading federal countries. A fast and steady decentralization process has taken place ever since
the country became a democracy in the 1970’s, entailing a progressive cession of some key ex-
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penditure and revenue items to regional governments.3 The 17 regional governments currently
manage, among other competencies, education (including universities), health and social services.
In 2017, sub-national governments (CCAA plus municipalities) managed some 50% of total gov-
ernment expenditure, up from 35% in 1995 and a share below 20% in the early 1980s. In parallel
to expenditure decentralization, there has also been a process of increased fiscal co-responsibility
(fiscal autonomy).
Third, this decentralization process took place in a period in which a number of supra-national
and national fiscal rules were implemented. National fiscal rules were implemented on top of EU-
wide ones. Nowadays there are four main fiscal rules: deficit, debt and expenditure rules, similar to
the European references, but subject to stricter monitoring procedures: In addition, another set of
rules govern the accumulation of regional commercial debt, and spell a number of monitoring steps,
including sanctions, in case payments are delayed with respect to legal periods. Despite these rules
being in place, deficit non-compliance has been common at the regional level (Delgado-Te´llez et al.
(2016)).
Four, Spanish regions have traditionally been very active in international regional bond markets,
ranking only behind the US, Germany, Japan, China and Canada (see Pe´rez and Prieto (2015);
Canuto and Liu (2013); Delgado and Pe´rez (2018); Romeu (2013)). In 2017, total outstanding
regional public debt amounted to some 288 bn euro (about 24.8% of Spanish GDP). For the whole
period 1995-2017, average regional debt amounted to 11.1% of GDP, of which more than 40% was
in the form of securities (other than shares). The weight of securities over total debt fell sharply
during the economic crisis due to a partial closure of financial markets for the CCAA and the rising
financing cost, reaching its lowest level of 16.2% in 2017.
Fifth, Spain’s CCAA’s fiscal credibility was also damaged over the past decade by the increase
of liabilities not accounted for in the standard, European concept of public debt.4 Those vehicles
3This decentralization process emanates from the current Spanish Constitution (voted in 1978) which, in its
second article, recognizes the rights to self-government of “regions and nationalities”, within the Spanish nation.
4 Excessive Deficit Procedure debt (EDP). Public debt is defined in the Protocol No. 12 on the excessive deficit
procedure annexed to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as “[...] total gross debt at nominal value
outstanding at the end of the year and consolidated between and within the sectors of general government”. Article
1(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2009 specifies the definition of Maastricht debt and deficit in statistical
terms including the treatment of trade credits.
include the debt issued by companies controlled by regional governments and the accounts payable
outstanding (including commercial debt). The literature suggest that these instruments may have
been used by sub-national governments to circumvent the constraints on debt issuance they are
subject to (and that only apply to conventional channels of financing) as some political economy
arguments would suggest (see Ferna´ndez Llera and Garc´ıa Valin˜as (2013)).
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In this paper we move beyond the available literature that analyzes the role of fiscal federalism
variables in the determination of regional public finances, the main difference being our focus on
the determinants of the dynamics of public debt, rather than on primary balances as it is usually
the case in the related literature. We deem changes in debt as our preferred object of study
instead of budget balances given that the former is a broader measure of net financing needs and
debt accumulation, and also because deficit-debt adjustments (stock-flow reconciliation) can be
arbitrarily large, as in CCAAs in the period 2010-2013. In the latter respect, see Campos et al.
(2006) for an international perspective on this issue. Some papers that precede in certain respects
our work are Valle´s Gime´nez(2002), that also includes an excellent survey of pre-2002 papers on
the issue, Argimo´n and Hernaa´ndez de Cos (2012), Simon-Cosano et al. (2013) or Mussons-Olivella
(2017), among others.5 In addition, we explore a more up-to-date period of time and include a
number of non-standard fundamental variables, in particular those related to the structure and
composition of public debt, the definition of fiscal rules’ variables, and the interaction of regional
public enterprises’ debt and commercial debt with regular public debt.
Among the set of determinants we pay special attention to: (i) institutional factors, such as
fiscal decentralization and fiscal rules, including self-correcting mechanisms like the reaction to past
debt and past deviations from targets; (ii) political factors, related with the electoral cycle and the
composition of government; (iii) market-disciple indicators, such as the change in the implicit
interest rate and the structure of debt itself; (iv) non-EDP debt, focusing on public corporations
controlled by CCAA and regional commercial debt. We find that self-correcting mechanisms and
market-induced discipline, and to a lesser extent deeper fiscal decentralization, have been associated
in the sample under study with heightened fiscal discipline.
Our paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide some stylized facts on regional
public debt in Spain. In Section 3 we focus on two relevant institutional issues: the process
5The institutional determinants of local governments’ indebtedness have been more widely analyzed in the liter-
ature, mainly from a less aggregated-macro perspective than the standard in papers looking at the determinants of
CCAAs’ debt. See for example Cabase´s et al. (2007) or Bastida el al. (2013), and the references quoted therein.
of fiscal decentralization since the early 1980s and the evolution of fiscal rules affecting regional
governments in Spain. These issues are further expanded in appendices I and II. In turn, in Section
4 we perform the empirical analysis of the paper, covering first the standard approach of papers on
fiscal federalism, and moving next to a deeper look at the role of fiscal rules and market discipline
indicators, to end up with some results on the link between regional governments’ standard debt
and other public debt concepts. Finally, in Section 5 we provide some conclusions.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1807
2 Stylized facts on regional public debt
2.1 Some trends
Spanish General Government debt increased in the period 2007-2017 by nearly 63 points of GDP.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the increase in debt was visible in all the subsectors of the General
Government. In particular, Central Government and CCAA non-consolidated debt moved from
29.5 and 5.7 percent of GDP, respectively, at the end of 2007, to 86.9% and 24.8% of GDP in 2017,
multiplying by 3 and 4 their amounts respectively.
The increase in public debt came hand-in-hand with increases in other liabilities not covered
by the extant definition of debt, but that are close complements, namely the aggregates of public
corporations’ debt and other accounts payable. The statistical category “other accounts payable”
consists of financial claims which are created as a counterpart of a financial or a non-financial trans-
action in cases where there is a timing difference between this transaction and the corresponding
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
20
40
60
80
100
m
ar
.-
95
ju
l.-
96
no
v.
-9
7
m
ar
.-
99
ju
l.-
00
no
v.
-0
1
m
ar
.-
03
ju
l.-
04
no
v.
-0
5
m
ar
.-
07
ju
l.-
08
no
v.
-0
9
m
ar
.-
11
ju
l.-
12
no
v.
-1
3
m
ar
.-
15
ju
l.-
16
AC: EDP debt AATT: EDP debt (rigth axis)
5
10
15
20
25
30
0
20
40
60
80
10
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Central Government Sub-national governments
0
5
10
15
20
25
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Autonomous Communities Local Government
In % of GDP In % of GDP
payment. This category includes transactions in financial claims which stem from the early or late
payment for transactions in goods or services, distributive transactions or secondary trade in finan-
cial assets. They consist of the counterpart transactions in case payment is due and not yet paid.
Debts arising from income accruing over time and arrears are also classified under this category.
This is clear from Figure 2. Regional public corporations’ debt increased up to 2010 and decreased
afterward, being the difference between the maximum and minimum over the whole period less
than one percentage points of GDP. Meanwhile, the“other accounts payable” increased steeply up
to the end of 2011 beginning of 2012, to decreased then sharply up to 2017. Nevertheless, its level
is still higher than the pre-crisis one.
Figure 1: The evolution of public debt in Spain, by sub-sector.
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2.2 A standard decomposition of debt changes
It is worth looking at the evolution of debt in the period under scrutiny through the lens of the
government budget constraint. Let Yt be nominal GDP at t and let Dt be the nominal value of
government debt. The government budget constraint accounts for how a nominal interest rate it,
net inflation πt, net growth in real GDP, gdpt, the net-of-interest deficit as a percent of GDP, deft,
and the deficit-debt adjustment, DDAt combine to determine the evolution of the government
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Other accounts payable Public Companies Debt (rigth axis)
Source: Banco de España
a. Moving average of the four consecutive quarters.
In % of GDP
debt-to-GDP-ratio,
Dt
Yt
=
1 + it
(1 + πt) (gdpt)
Dt−1
Yt−1
+ deft +
DDAt
Yt
(1)
were the nominal yield it and the real stock of debt Dt are averages of pertinent objects across
terms to maturity. Its linearized version, suitable for accounting decomposition of the fundamental
determinants of debt, takes the standard form
Dt
Yt
= (it − πt − gdpt) Dt−1
Yt−1
+
Dt−1
Yt−1
+ deft +
DDAt
Yt
(2)
With this decomposition at hand it is possible to analyze the determinants of changes in the
debt-to-GDP ratio. In Figure 3 we decompose these determinants for each year over the period
1996-2017 for the aggregate of CCAA (see 4 for the evolution of individual CCAA’s debt). CCAAs
reduced marginally their stock of debt in the period till 2007, with positive factors (real GDP
growth and inflation) broadly compensating the debt-increasing effect of interest payments and, to
a much lesser extent, primary deficits. With the burst of the most recent crisis, though, the latter
Figure 2: Other Autonomous Communities’ (regional governments) liabilities not included in the
standard definition of public debt.
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equilibrium was broken and a significant contribution of public deficits pushed public debt upwards.
Deficit-debt adjustments (stock-flow reconciliation) exerted a significant impact, in particular over
the period 2010-2013.
-4
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6
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
In % of GDP
Primary Balance Interest Payments Real GDP growth
GDP deflator growth Deficit-debt adjustment Change in debt
Figure 3: The determinants of changes in Regional Governments’ debt (changes as a percent of
GDP) in the period 1995-2017.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1807
2
0
2
4
6
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Andalusia
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
6
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Aragon
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Asturias
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
6
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Baleares
In % of GDP
2
0
2
4
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Canarias
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
6
8
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Cantabria
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
6
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Castilla y Leon
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Castilla-La Mancha
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
6
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Catalonia
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Valencia
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Extremadura
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Galicia
In % of GDP
2
0
2
4
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Madrid
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
6
8
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Murcia
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
6
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Navarra
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
Basque Country
In % of GDP
-2
0
2
4
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15 17
La Rioja
In % of GDP
Figure 4: Autonomous Communities’ (regional governments) debt evolution in the period 1995-
2017: changes as a percent of GDP.
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3 Institutional Framework
3.1 The process of fiscal decentralization in Spain
Spain is currently one of the most decentralized countries in the European Union. As mentioned
before, in 2017, 50% of general government expenditure was carried out by subnational governments,
with about 36% and 14% in the hands of regional governments and local governments, respectively
(see Figure 5, second panel). This was the outcome of a gradual transfer of responsibilities for the
management of specific services from the Central Government to the CCAAs since the beginning
of the 1980s. In particular, CCAAs were responsible for 92% of public expenditure on healthcare
and 91% in education in 2016, and they managed a significant part of other expenditure functions.
The transfer of expenditure responsibilities from the Central Government to the CCAAs has,
however, neither come about at the same pace, nor have they been on the same scale in all CCAAs.
The main differences concern the time at which the various CCAAs took over education and
health competencies. On the one hand, the regions that gained autonomy through article 143
of the Spanish Constitution did not assume the respective management of educational and health
services until the 1990s and early twenty-first century. On the other, Andalusia, the Canary Islands,
Catalonia, Galicia and the Valencia Community, along with the Basque Country and Navarre,
namely the regions that gained autonomy through article 151 of the Constitution and those with
their own specific status due to their historical jurisdiction (the so-called “Re´gimen Foral”), assumed
health and education responsibilities practically from the beginning of the 1980s.
In parallel to this process of devolution of expenditure responsibilities to the regions, a financing
system for the subnational governments was also progressively developed (see Figure 5, first panel,
on the extent of revenue decentralization). Again, the process was not completely homogeneous
across regions. In particular, a distinction should be drawn between the ordinary-regime CCAAs
(all except the Basque Country and Navarre), with partial fiscal autonomy, and the specific-status
CCAAs (the Basque Country and Navarre), which have full fiscal autonomy with the exception of
customs tariffs.
In essence, the Basque country provincial authorities (A´lava, Guipu´zcoa y Vizcaya) and Navarre’s
regional government have the power to maintain, establish and regulate, inside their territory, the
tax regime, taking into account some coordinating provisions established with the Central Govern-
ment, which basically imply that the effective overall tax burden arising from their regulatory power
must not be lower than the existing in the rest of the country. Accordingly, they are responsible
for collecting all taxes except those included in Customs Revenue and those raised through Fiscal
Monopolies. As a consequence of the fact that the taxes collected by these regions include almost
all those existing, while at the same time the Central Government provides some services in these
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 16 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1807
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
D
K E
S
B
E
S
E
D
E F
I
A
T
E
U
28 P
L
N
L IT
R
O C
Z
LV H
R E
E
U
K LT F
R
B
G S
I
S
K
P
T
H
U
LU I
E E
L
C
Y
M
T
Regional Local
Ratio of subnational governments' revenue to general government revenue (%)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
D
K S
E
B
E
E
S
D
E F
I
A
T
E
U
28 P
L
N
L IT C
Z
LV R
O
H
R E
E
U
K LT B
G F
R S
I
S
K
H
U P
T
LU I
E E
L
C
Y
M
T
Regional Local
Ratio of subnational governments' expenditure to general government expenditure (%)
Source: EUROSTAT
a. Country nomenclature following ISO 3166/2.
regions (defense, diplomatic representation, etc.), the Basque Country and Navarre transfer some
of their resources to the center, by means of the so-called “Cupo”, in order to contribute to the
financing of these services.
The financing arrangements for the ordinary-regime CCAAs have been developed over time on
the basis of five-year agreements. In this regard, the so called Fiscal and Financial Policy Council
(Consejo de Pol´ıtica Fiscal y Financiera, CPFF, hereafter) played a key role. The Council is
composed of the nation-wide ministers of Economy and Finance and of the CCAA ministers of
Finance, and acts as a consultative and discussion body with wide-ranging tasks relating to the
co-ordination of the CCAAs financial activity. The agreements reached within the CPFF form the
basis for developing the CCAAs financing arrangements. For more details see Appendix I.
3.2 The fiscal rules framework
From the outset of the introduction of the modern welfare state in Spain, subnational governments
were subject to some constraints and limitations on their capacity to borrow and/or generate
budget deficits. In the case of the CCAAs, they were empowered to take on debt, albeit subject
to certain limits. Specifically, credit operations at less than one year were to be used to cover
Figure 5: International comparison of sub-national governments’ revenues and expenditures (2017).
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6The time period for the empirical analysis is selected due to data availability constraints.
temporary treasury requirements, while credit operations at over one year, should meet the following
requirements: (i) that the total amount of the credit is earmarked for financing investment spending;
and (ii) that the annual amount of debt repayments plus interest does not exceed twenty five percent
of the CCAAs’ current revenues. For the arrangement of credit operations abroad and for debt
issuance and any other resort to public credit, the CCAAs require the authorization of the Central
Government.
CCAAs’ credit operations should be coordinated among the CCAAs themselves and in keeping
with the Central Governments debt policy, with the CCAAs obliged to submit an annual debt
programme to the Central Government. Once the programme has been agreed, it entails the au-
tomatic authorization of all the operations contained therein. The application of the programme
may be changed by a region following a new proposal to the government. Further, the Central
Government itself may suspend the programme on a precautionary basis should there be excep-
tional circumstances that might hamper the Treasury’s financial policy or involve imbalances in the
relationship between the level of external and domestic debt. For more details on national fiscal
rules of application to the conduction of CCAAs budgetary policies, see Appendix II.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section we move to the study of the determinants of the evolution of regional public debt,
measured its change in terms of regional GDP. We do so by estimating empirical models in which
we exploit the pool structure of our data: 17 regions over the period 1995-2017. The analysis we
exploit the rich structure of institutional changes that happened over that long time span6 to pose
testable hypothesis on the impact of fiscal decentralization and fiscal rules. In addition, we include
in the analysis political economy and market-disciple indicators.
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Table 1: Variables and expected impact on debt changes.
Channels Expected impact
Economic factors
Economic Cycle (t-1) -
Inflation deviation -
GDP per capita deviation +/-
House inflation deviation -
Fiscal Rules
Fiscal Rules -
FR x Economic growth deviation +
FR x Budgetary Balance deviation +/-
FR x Debt/GDP (t-1) deviation -
Institutional factors
Revenue autonomy -
Vertical Fiscal Imbalances +
Health expenditure +/-
Education expenditure +/-
Investment expenditure +/-
Political factors
Electoral date distance -
Concordance +/-
% Left-wing MPs +/-
% Regionalist MPs +/-
Market Discipline
Rating (t-1) +
Short/long term debt +/-
Securites/Loans debt -
Non-resident/resident debt -
Implicit interest -
Issuance interest -
Budget compliance (t-1) -/+
Non-EDP debt
Fund for suppliers’ payments +
Public companies debt +
Commercial debt +
4.1 Data and hypotheses to be tested
In line with the extant literature, we include diverse channels that may affect the evolution of debt
such as economic, political and institutional factors. Table 1 represents the main channels, and
the variables used to test the main theoretical hypotheses. Apart from the common variables used
in the literature, we also include a number of less conventional variables linked to the structure of
public debt and market disciple measurement.
Economic variables used as controls As regards the economic factors, we follow closely the
definitions and variables of Argimo´n and Herna´ndez de Cos (2012). Economic theory has highlighted
the economic cycle as a fundamental determinant of budget balances and, as a consequence, of
changes in public debt. We use budget compliance over GDP to understand the effect of deficits
7We measure the budget compliance as the difference between the actual budget in cash terms and the initial
on the debt accumulation.7 In economic downturns budget deficits increase, either through the
operation of automatic stabilizers or through the impact of counter-cyclical discretionary fiscal
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policies designed to stabilize the economy, while the opposite occurs in expansions.8 In addition to
this channel, economic growth erodes the stock of public debt when measured as a percent of GDP.
Indeed, even high debt ratios can be sustainable in a framework of healthy economic growth, while
in a situation of low or negative growth even low debt ratios can turn out to be non-sustainable.
We include in our analysis the lag of yearly real growth rate of each CCAA (variable Economic
cycle), taken from the Annual Regional Accounts published by the Spanish Statistical Office (INE).
Among the set of economic factors, we also include the deviation from the regional average of
GDP per capita as control variable as a measure of the degree of economic development,9 but the
relation with the debt evolution is not straight-forward. Ceteris paribus, a richer CCAA would
have more margin of maneuver to cope with a debt surge, while at the same time because of the
larger resources it may find it easier to obtain private financing at a lower cost, encouraging it to
increase its debt more. In general, at a country level experiences very diverse experience, having
some of the richest countries with enormous amounts of debt, such a Japan.
Another relevant economic factor behind debt accumulation may be the evolution of prices, as
prescribed by the government budget constraint. Here the literature usually emphasizes the role
of asset prices that may affect fiscal outcomes basically through the tax system (taxes on capital
gains and losses, taxes on transaction, and tax relief, in particular, in the Spanish case, for house
purchases). In the case of Spain, financial and non-financial assets form the basis of certain taxes
managed and collected by CCAAs. Available information for variables that could capture asset
prices at the regional level is scarce. Because of its relevance in the boom period (1995-2007) and
its availability, housing prices might be a good proxy to capture the incidence of assets on regional
public finances. We define a variable as follows: deviation of the change in each region’s index of
housing prices with respect to the national mean.
More generally, overall inflation is a factor that is typically considered as key in the debt
8Some authors point out, however, that the higher revenues in economic boom periods may generally entail
pressure on the growth of public spending, in such a way that the relationship between the economic cycle and the
budget balance may be altered or, at least, evidence asymmetrical behavior over the course of the cycle. See Morris
and Schuknecht (2007), on related grounds.
9This deviation is measured as the GDPpc divided by the average GDPpc multiplied by 100.
ratio determination although it may exercise opposing forces over the debt accumulation. On one
hand, the indirect effect the inflation may have over the tax revenues (depending on the degree
of wage indexation) and the direct through its deflating effect on the debt-to-GDP ratio may be
compensated by the increase of expenditures that are indexed to price evolution. 10 The incidence
10Apart from the impact on nominal GDP (the denominator of the debt ratio), higher inflation may increase
the budget deficit through higher nominal interest rates and a higher real cost of purchases of goods and services
or investment and, in general, of those items of public spending that can be indexed (e.g., pensions and wages).
In the presence of non-indexed taxes, inflation may also generate higher revenues if, for instance, the tax rates are
progressive. See Herna´ndez de Cos et al. (2016).
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of price changes (measured by the changes in the CPI) will be captured by a variable defined as the
deviation of each region’s inflation in relation with the national mean, in such a way that possible
common trends are taken care of.
Fiscal Rules Fiscal rules in Spain have increased in variety and strength over the past decades.
Therefore, it is vital to clarify whether the rules have been effective or not. In order to do so,
we consider the measure of the strength of fiscal rules developed by the European Commission,
the so called Fiscal Rules Index, that is available for the whole period of study.11 Public debt
developments may be affected by the presence of different types of fiscal rules insofar as they
supposedly pose a permanent constraint on fiscal policy. In addition to their role in enhancing
fiscal discipline, such fiscal rules may further contribute to the reduction of uncertainty about
future fiscal policy developments (see Plekhanov (2005), for a discussion of rules-based controls on
regional governments’ borrowing compared to other alternatives). One of the main hypothesis that
we intend to contrast is whether fiscal rules have subdued the surge of regional debt, i.e. if the
rules have had the expected dissuasive effect. Thus, if fiscal rules are effective, we would expect
that an increase in strength of rules will entail a moderation of the upward evolution of the debt.
We also include the interaction of this index with three variables: lagged economic growth, the lag
of the deviation of budget balances with respect to the average for all CCAA, and the lag of the
deviation of the debt-to-GDP ratio to the average.12 The main idea is to test whether fiscal rules
11See https://ec.europa.eu/info/publications/fiscal-rules-database_en. The new index is a normalized
one, with an starting value of -0.45 to an ending value of 2.27. We have rescaled the variable so that there are no
negative values that could hinder the estimation sign interpretation
12Budgetary Balances are obtained from the National Accounts (NA) data published by the Finance Ministry.
Because data is only available at an annual basis from 2000 onwards, the beginning of the sample is completed using
the public accounts’ budgetary data (cash-based). This strategy will be used for all series. We use the lag of the
Budget Balance over GDP to prevent any endogeneity possible in the analysis.
are more effective depending on the economic situation of the CCAA.
Thus, while there are no previous insights about the effectiveness of fiscal rules when economic
growth is higher or smaller, it is plausible to think that if a CCAA has a stronger growth, the
Central Government would be more stringer in the application of rules in this case, and thus rules
would be more effective. Therefore, we would expect a negative impact for the interacted variable.
A similar reasoning may be applied to the other interacted variables. If the budget balance ratio
is worse for a CCAA in t-1, i.e. it has a higher deficit or a smaller surplus, fiscal rules would be
effective if in the current year the debt does not grow as much. This would mean that the rules are
effective for those CCAA with less sound finances. In the case of the debt interaction variable, when
a CCAA has a higher debt the fiscal rules would be effective if the impact is negative, meaning that
the higher the debt, the less would grow the debt on the following period. It may be noted that in
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previous studies, such as Argimo´n and Herna´ndez de Cos (2012) and Delgado-Te´llez et al. (2016),
fiscal rules do not seem to be very effective in deterring the deficit non-compliance. Therefore, we
would not expect a high effectiveness of fiscal rules in controlling debt evolution.
Political and institutional factors The literature has proven the necessity of including political
and institutional factors in the standard analysis (typically focused on the study of budget balances)
to explain the persistence of budget deficits and the accumulation of debt in advanced economies.
In our analysis we include a number of political variables: (i) ideology, measured, first, by the
percentage of left-wing MPs over the total seats of regional parliaments, and second, by the percent
of regionalist parties’ MPs (parties that only operate in a given region, and do not form part
explicitly or implicitly, of a national party) over the total number of seats of the regional parliament;
the first variable aims at capturing potential pro-spending biases depending on the ideological
orientation of the regional government, while the second could be instrumental for testing the
existence of different attitudes towards public debt accumulation depending on the scope of the
objective function of the regional government; in both cases there are no specific assumptions; (ii)
a dummy for the political concordance of the center and the periphery (region), that measures
the political alignment between the government of a given region and the central government; (iii)
electoral cycle: instead of the standard election dummy that display a value of one in an election
year and a zero otherwise, we use a transformation of the original variable to measure proximity to
elections, computed as a continuous variable as the distance to elections (see Franzese Jr (2000),
Franzese Jr (2002), Mink and de Haan (2005)).13 This variable takes the value of one in the
electoral year, and in the next period it would take 1/number of years left until next election, and
so on14. There are two possible expectations about the impact of the electoral cycle. First, the
year after elections, governments may start new investment projects, with the intention of finishing
them before the next electoral date. Thus, debt would increase the most in the first years of the
electoral cycle. But, on the other hand, expenditure tends to increase the near the electoral date
is. Thus it would imply a surge of debt to finance the extra-expenditure.
Fiscal federalism-related control variables The territorial organization of a country has
also been signaled by the extant literature as a further determinant of the fiscal situation, either
measured by the fiscal balance or by the stock of debt. In particular, the responsibilities assumed by
the regions, the instruments for financing them, and the relationships between regional and central
governments are all factors that certainly affect the aggregate fiscal outcomes of a given country
and, more specifically, the distribution of fiscal outcomes among the different layers of government.
13On electoral cycles and budgetary outcomes see, for example, Von Hagen (2010) or Mink and de Haan (2005).
14Thus, if there are 4 years between elections, the variable would take 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1
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In particular, the literature has devoted some effort to the existence of a so-called soft budget
constraint problem whereby a regional government may have incentives to conduct an undisciplined
fiscal policy under the expectation that the Central Government will intervene in case of trouble
(see Qian and Roland (1998); Kornai et al. (2003); Sorribas-Navarro (2012); Delgado-Te´llez et al.
(2016)).
Following the literature we include in our analysis some alternative measures of fiscal co-
responsibility, measured by: (i) Tax autonomy, the ratio of taxes over which the regions do have
normative power, over their total non-financial revenues in NA terms;15 (ii) The ratios of expen-
diture on education and health over regional GDP that represent the evolution of expenditure
decentralization over the last 22 years.16 Also the ratio of investment over total expenditure is
used as a proxy of voluntary spending. (iii) Vertical Fiscal imbalances which is proxied following
Eyraud and Lusinyan (2013) by the difference of total revenues and total expenditure, both net
of transfers with the other Sub-sectors of Public Administration. The literature argues that there
15The period 1995-1999 is obtained as a linear extrapolation with the execution data, as the NA accounts only
cover the period 2000-2017. All NA data comes from the General Intervention Board of the State Administration
website
16Yearly disaggregated data is available separately the COFOG publication available at the Finance Ministry,
being 2016 the last year available.
should be correspondence between the extent of a given region’s spending responsibilities and its
fiscal autonomy (fiscal co-responsibility), the latter being understood as the ability of the regions
to generate income to finance that spending. Otherwise, vertical fiscal imbalances could emerge in
the regions that would be usually filled by federal transfers. These transfers distort the relation-
ship that should exist between the level of taxes and the benefits obtained by citizens, creating a
common pool problem. As regards the impact of own revenue decentralization on fiscal balances,
Governatori et al. (2012) discuss that theory does not provide clear predictions. On the one hand,
a high value of a tax autonomy means that regional governments have more own resources to cover
a given amount of expenditures, leading to better fiscal balances. On the other hand, one has to
acknowledge that this type of variable conveys no information on the relative size of regional own
revenues compared to their expenditures, which is probably a better way to capture regional gov-
ernments incentives to behave in a financially responsible way. In addition, the impact of revenue
decentralization may also differ depending on the share of transfers/taxes in CCAAs’ revenues.
Market discipline, structure of debt Beyond the factors analyzed in the previous paragraphs,
the ability to increase debt by a given level of administration is fully determined by its ability to
raise the necessary funds. In addition to increasing taxes or decreasing expenditure, the CCAA
need external financing (national or international). Thus, either investors buy the debt of a CCAA
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or banks grant loans to the regions. One may conjecture that market pressure might be a key
determinant on the change in public debt. The case of Spain is not one in which there is full reliance
on capital markets to contain sub-national borrowing, as in the cases of Canada, Switzerland, and
the United States. The latter are cases in which the Central Government does not set any limits
on regional government’s borrowing, so that these levels of government are free to decide the form
of borrowing, and may decide by themselves to adopt a fiscal rule in an attempt to enhance their
credit standing in the market.17 Before 2012, in the Spanish framework regional governments
were constrained by upper-level rules, as described above, while at the same time were subject to
strict market scrutiny. But, the introduction of the FLA implied a change in the legal framework,
imposing to those CCAA that decided to enter the financing program a reinforced conditionality
due to the factual loss of the market discipline, as CCAA stopped depending on investors to finance
their needs.
17In Switzerland, after an episode of soaring debt over the 90’s, the Government introduced a debt brake rule,
which is a highly strict rule, according to which the deficit of one year must be compensated in the next years, as
explained by Bodmer(2006).
To approach the influence of market discipline, we explore the following control variables: (i)
the implicit interest rate, as a measure of the market pressure 18; (ii) the aggregate average issuance
cost rate is used, but taking into account a caveat, and that is that some CCAA do not generally
access to markets for getting financing for their debt. But it is a fair proxy for the market distress
CCAA may have to confront when they need market financing; (iii) a number of variables linked to
the composition of debt, as follows. First, the ratings in last period may impact the debt evolution,
because the lower the ratings the harder should be to issue new debt. Second, the ratio of short-to-
long run debt, being short term debt the one with a maturity less or equal to 12 months. Short-term
debt could be associated with the reaction to sudden changes in market sentiment. Thus, it is not
always a negative indicator, because a Government may expect a reduction of interest in the near
future, and therefore it would prefer short term debt until costs decrease.19 In a framework of
worsened perception about a given sovereign, though, increased reliance on short-term debt can
lead to a heightened vulnerabilities, as worsening perceptions of a given region’s creditworthiness
can quickly feed into higher interest costs (see also IMF, 2004). Third, the ratio of securities to
loans, with the prior in mind that loans could be more easily obtained in somewhat “captive”
markets vs. open competition to capture investors in securities. In the particular case of the
regions of Spain, regional savings banks (“Cajas de ahorros”) typically assumed a role as CCAAs
bankers. And finally, the ratio of debt held by non-resident vs. that held by residents, might be
18Measured as the ratio of interest payments over the stock of debt
19Some papers have found short-term debt to be an indicator of vulnerability to international financial crises:
Borensztein et al. (2004), Rodrik and Velasco (1999), Bussie`re and Mulder (1999).
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also a measure of stress in the markets as, a priori, in the case of undisciplined governments that
are perceived as pursuing unsustainable fiscal policies, non-residents tend to react more quickly
and shift portfolios towards more secure assets than residents.
Additional control variables: pressure from units accounted for outside the boundaries
of the General Government sector In particular, we consider the two non-EDP debt measures
described in Section 2: the debt of public corporations owned by a given region, and the “other
accounts payable”. Indeed, the related literature would suggest that: (i) under tight budgetary
rules a government may try to circumvent the constraints by cutting transfers to public corporations
that, in turn, can finance the same spending by issuing debt that is not computed by means of
the same accounting standards used to define the rule (typically as in National Accounts); (ii) an
excessive level of non-standard debt may end up generating pressure on the responsible government
to bail-out the external indebtedness vehicle.20 (iii) The commercial debt may be used as a buffer in
time of crisis, encouraging governments to delay payments to their suppliers, as it actually occurred
in Spain up to 2011. We also include an informed dummy of the FFPP payments in percentage of
GDP. This includes all the payments of the suppliers of the CCAA made by the Central Government
funds.
4.2 The empirical model
The incidence of the different determinants on the changes in public debt mentioned in the previous
section will be tested by means of a standard econometric model that can be specified in quite
general terms as:
Δ
Dit
Yit
= αi +
N∑
j=1
βj Ωjit + it (3)
Under the proposed approach, the change in public debt of each regional government,i, at time t,
ΔDitYit , depends on a set of control variables, Ω, encompassing the economic, political, institutional,
market-induced and non-EDP factors mentioned above. Following the traditional fixed-effects
model, αi in equation (3) aims at capturing all the unobservable CCAA effects that are time-
unvarying, while it is an error term assumed to be white noise. As for the estimation method,
and in order to avoid any biases stemming from the possible correlation between the individual
effects and the regressors, we estimate model (3) in first differences. Moreover, given the possible
simultaneity of some of the control variables and the dependent variable, the estimation is carried
20On a discussion about the role of public sector enterprises in Spain see Ferna´ndez Llera and Garc´ıa Valin˜as
(2013).
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out by the Generalized Method of Moments (Arellano and Bond (1991)), using as instruments
lagged regressors.
For robustness, we also estimate a fix effect model that is not estimated in inter-temporal
differences. Thus we don’t include the lag of the dependent variable in this estimation. It includes
a fix effect for CCAA. Main results do no differ between both kinds of models. We have chosen the
fix effect instead of the random effect model following the Hausman test criteria results, otherwise
we would have estimated a random effect model.
4.3 Results
The results are shown in tables 2, 3, 4 and 5. The two first result tables include two different
samples, the whole sample (1995-2017) and a sample without the recent crisis period (1995-2007)
for the sake of robustness, as well as the Fix Effect models estimation.
In Table 2 we explore the role of the main economic variables and of the fiscal rules. In Table
3 we focus on studying the institutional and political factors. The effect of the different measures
related with the market discipline is shown in Table 4, while in Table 5 we consider the impact of
the debt (non-EDP) of public corporations and other accounts payable on the CCAA’s debt.
Beginning with the baseline model shown in Table 2, there are six models included in this table.
The first two columns show the GMM model whole sample, the second two the GMM model with a
restricted sample from 1995 to 2007, and finally the last two columns show the fix effect model for
the whole sample. The dependent variable is the change in the ratio of debt over GDP. The first
conclusion we may draw from the results is that CCAA debt does not seem to follow an explosive
path as both the lagged variable and the lag level of debt show a negative impact on the change of
debt that in the case of the level of debt is highly significant. This means that whenever the level
of debt or the change in debt increases in the previous year, the change in debt will be subdued in
the current one. This is probably due to a combination of factors, first, if CCAA debt increases,
the Central Government would control more thoroughly the finances of the CCAA, and second, it
would be harder for the CCAA to finance this surge of debt at a reasonable cost, encouraging a
stronger fiscal effort to reduce the deficit.
The second main result from the estimations is that among the economic evolution determi-
nants, only economic growth seems to matter in the debt evolution.21 Meanwhile, GDP per capita
deviation has a negative but weak impact, signaling that those CCAA that have a higher GDP per
capita tend to have less accumulation of debt. Nor the Price Index neither the house price inflation
seem to have any significant impact on debt evolution.
21We use the lag of the GDP growth to avoid possible endogeneity problems.
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Other two relevant variables included in this table are the budgetary compliance and the Fund
for Suppliers’ Payments vaiable. The former, has a puzzling outcome because it is not significant
in the GMM models, and only it is significant in the fix effect model. If the sign of the coefficient is
negative, as it is in the fixed effects and the long sample GMM, it means that fiscal non-compliance
in the past does not restrict regional governments in the present. The latter has a significant and
direct effect on debt evolution as expected, because the funds received since 2012 rose directly the
amount of standard debt. Thus, we use the contemporaneous data in order to take into account
this specific shock of the transformation of the commercial debt in EDP debt.
Still in Table 2, the last four variables are the ones related with the fiscal rules. First, fiscal
rules strength index (FRI) in the previous period does not have a significant impact on the debt
variation. This is a very striking result, as it is expected that fiscal rules would entail a break on
the debt evolution. But, as shown in other previous studies such as Argimo´n and Herna´ndez de
Cos (2012) or Delgado-Te´llez et al. (2016), current fiscal rules are not very effective in coping with
fiscal non-compliance (deficit control). In Spain, most of the Central Government control until
recently was concentrated on deficit targets compliance. There were no specific debt targets until
2012. Notwithstanding, there are some significant results when interacting the fiscal rules index
with GDP growth, the budget balance and the debt-to-GDP ratio in deviations from the CCAA
average. As it appears, fiscal rules would tend to be more effective when economic growth is lower
and when debt levels are higher and when budgetary balance are worse, but in this case, this result
is not significant in the main GMM model. Thus, the two last results are as expected, but it is
slightly puzzling that fiscal rules are more effective when economic growth is more dimmed. This
could be rationalized if one considers that in bad economic times public finances can be at stress,
and tight rules might be necessary to cope with potential sustainability problems.
In Table 3 we focus on the analysis of two main channels, the political and the institutional
factors. Political factors seem to have a weak effect. Curiously, the only political variable that has
some effect is the weight of regional party parliamentarians but neither in the short GMM nor in
the FE has any significance. More interesting is the results of the institutional factors’ impact. The
revenue autonomy plays a key role in debt evolution, as expected. When CCAA have a larger share
of their revenues coming from taxes and other sources of revenue that are directly controlled by the
regional government, debt seems to be more stable. This is because first, they can better anticipate
the amounts of revenues they will have in an specific year, in contrast to a situation of heightened
dependence on Central Government transfers, and second, regional governments would have more
margin of maneuver because they could raise tax rates instead of relying on new debt. In the same
sense, Vertical Fiscal Imbalances have a direct impact on debt increases, as expected. Finally, only
the health expenditure variable displays a direct and significant impact on the dependent variables.
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This may have to do with the rigidity of health expenditure, with enormous fixed costs and the
social resistance to decrease this specific expenditure.
Table 4 includes the analysis of the role of market-discipline related variables. The following
additional results in this table can be underlined: (i) the two proxies for the cost of financing,
the implicit interest rate and the issuance rate behave similarly. An increase in implicit interest
rate and the issuance interest rate discourages the increases in debt. Thus the increase in costs
would have a deterrent effect on CCAA to augment the debt.22 (ii) market discipline due to ratings
evolution does not seem to work, as the results are not significant in neither of the samples and the
sign even changes. (iii) Neither the ratio of short to long term debt nor the ratio of loans by non-
residents vs. by residents has a significant effect. In the first case it matches with our hypothesis
of ambiguity of the short-long ratio. In the second, it may have to do with a problem related with
the data, because it only includes the loans held by foreigner banks and local ones. But there is no
data available about securities, and the holding structure of securities may be different from that
of loans. (iv) Finally, The ratio of securities over loans presents a negative significant sign. This
ratio would imply that regional governments with better access to less “captive” investors (those
buying securities) tend to be more disciplined from a fiscal point of view. Thus it would seem that
some degree of market discipline is in place.
Finally, in Table 5 we show some estimated models to assess the linkages between regional
governments’ debt and their public corporations’ (EEPP) debt and commercial debt23. There is no
significant effect of the amount of public companies debt. Meanwhile, the commercial debt has a
direct and significant impact on debt evolution, so that the dynamic evolution of commercial debt
has some predictive power over regional, EDP debt. Even though we do not show it in the table,
the results for this variable are alike for the short period 1995-2007.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we study the evolution and the determinants of regional’s debt evolution (measured
by the change in public debt). The main results of the analysis are as follows. First, political
factors played a limited role. Second, fiscal rules also played a limited role, being effective only
in bad economic times periods and in situations of high debt. Third, “the fiscal decentralization
22In the GMM model, the contemporaneous lag of implicit interest rate is included in the estimation so that
endogeneity problem may be solved. On the contrary, we considered that the issuance interest rate does no have the
problem of endogeneity as it is an average variable of all CCAAs and the data is common for all of them. Therefore
the increase in debt in one CCAA should not have a very significant effect on the average issuance rate
23This variable, though, is only available for the aggregate of CCAA.
design”, i.e. the distribution of revenues and expenditure competencies, is extremely relevant in
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keeping debt subdued. Fourth, market-disciple plays a role in regional public finances evolution.
And fifth, commercial debt seems to have been used as a substitute for regular debt.
Some policy conclusions are worth mentioning. First, the lack of effectiveness of fiscal rules
might be read in relation to the economic literature that emphasizes that a set of features are
crucial to achieve a certain incidence of any fiscal rule on the behavior of governments. In this
regard, issues such as transparency, the possibility and credibility of penalties for noncompliance,
and the existence of independent institutions responsible for monitoring compliance appear as
determinants of the success of the fiscal rules. Second, as argued by Oates (2008), fiscal discipline
may be enhanced when sub-national governments’ spending competences are funded to a larger
extent with own revenues. Indeed, in previous studies for the Spanish case, such as Delgado-
Te´llez et al. (2016), vertical fiscal imbalances play a key role in fiscal non-compliance. Third,
market discipline may be key in influencing regional governments fiscal prudence. Fourth, be aware
of possible law loopholes. The EDP debt definition does not include as part of the standard
definition of debt some potential risks, such as the commercial debt or the public companies debt.
Nevertheless, these debts may become standard debt under extraordinary circumstances. Thus,
higher level authorities should take into account possible shortcuts governments may use to fulfill
targets that do not entail a healthier financial situation. Therefore, commercial debt and public
companies debt should be considered as risk for the debt sustainability.
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Table 2: The determinants of regional governments’ debt changes (changes as a percent of GDP):
baseline models.
Dependent variable: Δ EDP debt GMM (1995-2017) GMM (1995-2007) FE (1995-2017)
Lagged dependent variable -0.12∗ -0.13∗ -0.13 -0.23∗ - -
(0.06) (0.07) (0.16) (0.13) - -
Economic cycle (t-1) -0.16∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.34∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Budgetary compliance (t-1) -0.08 -0.03 0.04 0.10 -0.30∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗
(0.05) (0.06) (0.14) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07)
EDP debt (t-1) -0.15∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.65∗∗∗ -0.55∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.02) (0.17) (0.12) (0.01) (0.01)
FFPP 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ - - 0.12∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) - - (0.01) (0.01)
Inflation deviation 0.06 -0.04 -0.16 -0.21∗ -0.16 -0.25
(0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18)
GDP per capita deviation -0.07∗ -0.07∗ -0.08∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ -0.00 0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
House Price deviation -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Fiscal Rules x Balance deviation (t-1) - -0.03 - -0.10∗∗ - -0.10∗∗∗
- (0.03) - (0.05) - (0.03)
Fiscal Rules x growth deviation (t-1) - 0.09∗∗∗ - 0.05 - 0.12∗∗∗
- (0.02) - (0.04) - (0.02)
Fiscal Rules x debt deviation (t-1) - -0.03∗∗∗ - -0.05 - -0.00
- (0.01) - (0.03) - (0.00)
Fiscal Rules Index (t-1) -0.07 - -0.04 - 0.06 -
(0.10) - (0.07) - (0.07) -
Number of observations 357 357 187 187 374 374
R-squared - - - - 0.72 0.75
Hansen 0.50 0.43 0.95 0.75 - -
m1 0.02 0.09 0.63 0.48 - -
m2 0.36 0.22 1.00 0.71 - -
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag
of the endogenous variable. Hansen is the p-value of the test of the over-identifying restrictions (see Hansen, 1982),
which is asymptotically distributed chi-squared under the null hypothesis that these moment conditions are valid. A
p-value equal or higher than 0.05 indicates that the instrument set is valid, which is confirmed under all models m1
and m2 are the p-values of serial correlation tests of order 1 and 2, respectively.
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Table 3: The determinants of regional governments’ debt changes (changes as a percent of GDP):
Political and Fiscal decentralisation variables
Dependent variable: Δ EDP debt GMM (1995-2017) GMM (1995-2007) FE (1995-2017)
Lagged dependent variable -0.12∗ -0.13∗ -0.15 -0.25 - -
(0.06) (0.07) (0.17) (0.17) - -
Economic cycle -0.16∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗∗ -0.05∗∗ -0.27∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Budgetary compliance (t-1) -0.08 -0.06 0.05 0.00 -0.40∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.15) (0.16) (0.06) (0.06)
EDP debt (t-1) -0.15∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ -0.59∗∗∗ -0.50∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.01) (0.14) (0.15) (0.01) (0.01)
FFPP 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ - - 0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) - - (0.01) (0.01)
Fiscal corresponsibility - -0.04∗∗ - -0.02∗ - 0.00
- (0.01) - (0.01) - (0.01)
Vertical Fiscal Imbalances - 0.09∗∗∗ - 0.07∗∗ - 0.05
- (0.03) - (0.03) - (0.03)
Education expenditure over GDP - -0.16 - 0.01 - 0.30∗
- (0.21) - (0.13) - (0.16)
Health expenditure over GDP - 0.48∗∗∗ - 0.25 - 0.52∗∗∗
- (0.11) - (0.24) - (0.10)
Investment expenditure over GDP - -0.14 - 0.10 - 0.10
- (0.19) - (0.20) - (0.11)
Concordance centre-periphery 0.17 - -0.05 - 0.17∗ -
(0.19) - (0.10) - (0.10) -
% Left-wing parties MPs -0.01 - -0.00 - 0.00 -
(0.02) - (0.02) - (0.01) -
Pro-autonomy 0.03∗∗ - -0.00 - 0.00 -
(0.01) - (0.02) - (0.00) -
Distance to elections -0.11 - 0.04 - 0.04 -
(0.07) - (0.08) - (0.16) -
Number of observations 343 324 187 154 360 341
R-Squared - - - - 0.709 0.78
Hansen 0.565 0.496 0.96 0.98 - -
m1 0.0561 0.0162 0.64 0.86 - -
m2 0.340 0.127 0.90 0.32 - -
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag
of the endogenous variable. Hansen is the p-value of the test of the over-identifying restrictions (see Hansen, 1982),
which is asymptotically distributed chi-squared under the null hypothesis that these moment conditions are valid. A
p-value equal or higher than 0.05 indicates that the instrument set is valid, which is confirmed under all models m1
and m2 are the p-values of serial correlation tests of order 1 and 2, respectively.
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Table 4: The determinants of regional governments’ debt changes (changes as a percent of GDP):
Market discipline.
Dependent variable: Δ EDP debt GMM (1995-2017) FE (1995-2017)
Lagged dependent variable 0.06 0.05 -0.06 -0.06 - -
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) - -
Economic cycle -0.15∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ -0.29∗∗∗ -0.30∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Budgetary compliance (t-1) 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.24∗∗∗ -0.26∗∗∗
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
EDP debt (t-1) -0.25∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗ -0.04∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
FFPP 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Rating (t-1) -0.12 - 0.00 - - -
(0.08) - (0.06) - - -
Ratio short/long term debt 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01∗ -0.01∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Ratio Securities / Loans -0.02∗∗ -0.02∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗ 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
Ratio debt non-residents / residents -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
Implicit interest rate -0.39∗∗∗ -0.32∗∗∗ - - -0.10∗∗∗ -
(0.10) (0.06) - - (0.02) -
Issuance interest rate - - -0.04 -0.05∗∗ - -0.07∗∗
- - (0.02) (0.03) - (0.03)
Number of observations 293 357 293 357 374 374
R-squared - - - - 0.75 0.74
Hansen 0.28 0.17 0.43 0.43 - -
m1 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 - -
m2 0.20 0.29 0.94 0.62 - -
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag
of the endogenous variable. Hansen is the p-value of the test of the over-identifying restrictions (see Hansen, 1982),
which is asymptotically distributed chi-squared under the null hypothesis that these moment conditions are valid. A
p-value equal or higher than 0.05 indicates that the instrument set is valid, which is confirmed under all models m1
and m2 are the p-values of serial correlation tests of order 1 and 2, respectively.
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Table 5: The determinants of regional governments’ debt changes (changes as a percent of GDP):
Non EDP components (public corporations owned by regional governments and other accounts
payable).
Dependent variable: Δ EDP debt GMM (1995-2017) FE (1995-2017)
Lagged dependent variable -0.28∗∗∗ -0.28∗∗∗ 0.03 - - -
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) - - -
Economic cycle -0.15∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ -0.17∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.39∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
EDP debt (t-1) -0.08∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
EEPP debt (t-1) -0.08 - -0.00 0.14 - 0.60∗∗∗
(0.56) - (0.68) (0.12) - (0.13)
Δ EEPP debt - -0.24 - - -0.36∗ -
- (0.25) - - (0.20) -
Commercial debt (t-1) 1.65∗∗∗ 1.63∗∗∗ - 1.37∗∗∗ 1.46∗∗∗ -
(0.29) (0.28) - (0.11) (0.11) -
Δ Commercial debt (t-1) - - 1.34∗∗∗ - - 1.18∗∗∗
- - (0.27) - - (0.16)
Number of observations 357 340 340 374 357 357
R-squared - - - 0.68 0.69 0.62
Hansen 0.10 0.12 0.03 - - -
m1 0.01 0.00 0.00 - - -
m2 0.59 0.59 0.36 - - -
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗: significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. Instrument set in all models includes the second and third lag
of the endogenous variable. Hansen is the p-value of the test of the over-identifying restrictions (see Hansen, 1982),
which is asymptotically distributed chi-squared under the null hypothesis that these moment conditions are valid. A
p-value equal or higher than 0.05 indicates that the instrument set is valid, which is confirmed under all models m1
and m2 are the p-values of serial correlation tests of order 1 and 2, respectively.
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I A historical view of the process of fiscal decentralization in Spain
Initially, until the approval of the autonomy charters, the administrative structures (pre-autonomous
entities) of the CCAAs were financed with Central Government transfers. Subsequently, the tran-
sition period running from the approval of the respective autonomy charters to the 1986 agreement
saw the transfer of most powers and the definition of financing channels, in the main through
Central Government transfers – participation of CCAAs in Central Government revenues and the
Inter-Territorial Compensation Fund (FCI) – supplemented with various taxes – taxes assigned by
the Central Government, own taxes and surcharges on Central Government taxes. In addition, the
CCAAs share in Central Government revenue was defined, in terms of the actual cost of the respon-
sibilities assumed, and in February 1982 the method of calculating this actual cost was approved
in the CPFF. Until 1984, the calculation was carried out by means of negotiations on committees
in which the State and CCAAs were represented on an equal footing. Between 1984 and 1987, the
percentage shares were fixed annually by law for the CCAAs as a whole.
In 1987 a new five year agreement on regional financing entered into force that radically changed
the method for calculating the share in State revenue. It was now defined as a transfer of resources
from the State to finance that part of the general responsibilities assumed, excluding health care
and social services responsibilities, not financed through assigned taxes. The distribution system
and the rules governing its future evolution were established. This system represented a signifi-
cant advance in that it was more objective and automatic, and the above-mentioned negotiations
between the State and the CCAAs and the ad hoc calculations disappeared. As regards tax rev-
enue, the assignment of taxes was extended to registration duties (Impuesto sobre Actos Jur´ıdicos
Documentados) and the Canary Islands’ Economic-Fiscal Regime (Re´gimen Econo´mico Fiscal) was
reformed with the creation of the Canary Islands General Indirect Tax (Impuesto General Indirecto
Canario). Finally, the criteria for distributing the FCI were modified in 1990 (Law 29/1990 of 16
December 1990), and this fund was adapted to the new EU legislation on structural funds. Expen-
diture on health care and social responsibilities were financed independently with specific transfers
from the Social security Treasury Department.24
24The criterion applied when setting the percentage of the State health budget (INSALUD) to be transferred is
that of resident covered population in the region in question, thus obtaining equality of per capita financing among
the CCAAs. Nonetheless, certain health services are usually maintained in State centers, and therefore the cost of
such centers is deducted from the INSALUD budget before calculating the fraction to be transferred. The same
is the case with the Health Research Fund, own revenue and the health programs of the Ministry of Health and
Consumption.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 38 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1807
were agreed in the CPFF, with the creation of the specific tranche of the share in State revenue,
corresponding to the share of 15% of “territorial” personal income tax payments (those arising
within each region). In any case, the financing of the CCAAs under the new agreement continued
to be based essentially on the share in State revenue. The share in State revenues was calculated as
follows. First, the total amount of shared revenues for the initial year was obtained starting from a
total volume of resources for the CCAAs as a whole, which was determined mainly by the resources
transferred in 1990 under the previous system. This overall volume of financing was divided into
two blocks, one for the article 143 CCAAs and the other for the article 151 CCAAs, with the
aim of treating regions with the same level of assumable powers equally. The volume included in
each of the two blocks was distributed among the CCAAs in accordance with certain weighted
socio-economic variables (population, insularity, area, administrative units, relative wealth, fiscal
effort and geographical dispersion), following a number of adjustments (among other adjustments, a
redistribution of 2.7% of the outcome was made on the basis of the relative poverty of the CCAAs).
The amount for each CCAA resulting from this distribution was reduced by an estimate of the
revenue from assigned taxes and from the charges for services for which responsibility had been
transferred. The resulting amount represented the initial financing obtained by each CCAA from
the share in State revenue. Finally, to determine the share in State revenue in the subsequent
years of the five-year period, the share in State revenue grew at the same rates as the so-called
“structurally adjusted tax revenue” (ITAE), namely State revenue from non-assignable direct and
indirect taxes, excluding resources from the EU, plus social security and unemployment insurance
contributions, subject to a ceiling determined by the growth rate of GDP and a floor determined
by the growth of Equivalent State Expenditure (the latter prevailing over the ceiling). These
percentages were only revised in the event of transfers of new services or the assignment of new
taxes. Moreover, given the significant financial problems with the arrangements in place to cover
health expenditure by the CCAAs, which basically implied that the CCAAs had to supplement the
financing from the Social security Treasury Department with contributions of resources from their
own budgets, the CPFF agreed in September 1994 on a new financing model for health assistance for
the period 1994-97. This took real spending on health for the year 1994 as its basis and determined
the growth of this spending in accordance with the nominal GDP for each year. On 23 September
1996, the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council (CPFF) approved the content of the regional financing
arrangements for the period 1997-2000. The core of the reform was as follows:(i) initially, 15% of
personal income tax receipts were assigned, but once responsibilities on education had been fully
transferred, at the end of the five-year period, 30% of this tax was assigned to the CCAAs; (ii)
On 20 January 1992 the regional financing arrangements for the five-year period 1992-1996
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regulatory powers were granted in respect of the taxes assigned25 and of the tranche corresponding
to the shared personal income tax (regulatory responsibilities for the tax rate schedule, including
the tax-free allowance and deductions26). The increase in fiscal co-responsibility and in regulatory
autonomy for the CCAAs was, however, limited by the simultaneous establishment of a system of
guarantees, which meant that the minimum increase in financing received by each CCAA would
be equal to GDP growth, unless the amendment of personal income tax rates or the setting of new
deductions by the regions were to bring about a loss of revenue in the CCAA tranche27. Note that
this system of guarantees entailed a significant change with respect to the system in force prior to
the reform, since under the previous financing arrangements, the GDP growth rate was the ceiling
not the floor for the growth in the general tranche of the share in State revenue. Furthermore,
in 1997, a new agreement for the financing of health services for the period 1998-2001 was also
reached. With this agreement, the resources earmarked for health financing grew over the period
in accordance with the growth rate of nominal GDP, as in the previous agreement. However,
health financing was drawn from two funds: a general fund, equivalent to that existing previously,
and another, specific fund, aimed at ensuring minimum financing to the CCAAs whose population
shrinks, at covering needs relating to medical training and research, and at compensating CCAAs
for the assistance provided to non-residents. The share-out to the CCAAs that have assumed
these responsibilities was made, in the case of the general fund, following the covered-population
criterion, with updated data. And in the case of the specific fund, it was conducted ensuring
25Before the 1997 reform, the taxes assigned were the wealth tax, the inheritance and gift tax, the tax on property
transfers and documented legal acts and the tax on gaming. The CCAAs were empowered to administer and levy
these taxes, but did not have regulatory powers. The 1997 reform introduced restricted regulatory powers over this
assigned taxes. In particular, regulatory responsibilities were established: over the tax-free allowance and the tax
rate schedule of the wealth tax (which must be progressive and have the same number of brackets as that of the
State, with the amount of the first bracket of the final tax base and the marginal rate also being the same); over
the rate structure (necessarily progressive) and, in the case of mortis causa acquisition, over reductions from the
tax base for the inheritance and gift tax. In the case of the tax on property transfers and documented legal acts,
the CCAAs may regulate the rate charged on property transactions, and on the establishment and assignment of
real rights relating thereto, as well as the rate payable on notarial documents. Lastly, in relation to gaming tax,
their powers extend to tax exemptions, applicable rates, fixed charges, allowances and accrual, and to management,
settlement, tax-collection and inspection matters.
26In particular, the CCAAs had the power to regulate the regional tax rate schedule, subject to the constraint
that the amount payable as a result of applying the individual or joint regional tax rate schedule to the ordinary final
tax base may be neither 20% higher nor 20% lower than the amount payable when the State tax rate schedule is
applied to the same tax base. Further, the CCAAs may create their own deductions for individuals and households,
non-corporate investment and the application of income, provided that they should not directly or indirectly entail
a reduction in the actual tax levied on any category of income.
27The minimum increase in personal income tax and the share in State revenue guaranteed to each was that of the
growth rate of nominal GDP. In addition, a third guarantee ensured the capacity to cover public services assumed
(non university education): in the last year of the five-year period, in the event of education services having been
transferred, the financing per inhabitant of each region could not be less than 90% of average per capita financing.
that no CCAA whose population has shrunk should see the volume of its health financing fall by
more than 0.25%, and financing extraordinary expenses relating to training and research and those
arising from assistance provided to non-residents.
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A new agreement came into force in 2002 that widened the CCAAs’ tax resources. The assigned
percentage of personal income tax was raised to 33% and, in addition, 35% of net VAT revenues,
40% of excise duties and 100% of the tax on electricity, of a new tax on retail hydrocarbon sales
and of the excise duty on specific means of transport were all assigned. Furthermore, the new
system extended the regulatory powers of the CCAAs in relation to assigned taxes.28 Lastly,
Central Government guarantees as to the minimum growth of the financial resources received by
each CCAA were eliminated.29
The last reform of the financing agreements of the CCAAs was approved at the end of 2009,
which resulted in additional resources for the regions. The new system raised the amount of
taxes transferred (to 50% in the case of the personal income tax and VAT; to 58% in the case
of excise duties on manufactured production of alcohol, tobacco and hydrocarbons)30 and CCAAs
received additional powers to modify their rates in some of these taxes.31 In addition, the criteria
for distributing the different tax revenues and transfers to the regions changed. As a result, and
for the base year, each CCAA receive 25% of its tax revenue, plus its participation in the so-
called Guarantee Fund plus its share on the so-called Global Sufficiency Fund. In addition, two
additional funds were created, of lower quantitative importance, the Competitiveness fund and the
Cooperation fund to promote regional income convergence. The Guarantee Fund is formed by the
contribution of 75% of the tax revenues assigned to CCAAs plus some additional funds added by
the Central Government in the base year; then the fund is distributed among CCAAs on the basis
of the weighted average of 7 variables, of which population-related variables are the most relevant.
These variables are revised annually and the Central Government contribution to the guarantee
Fund is linked to the growth rate of the Central Government’s tax revenues. In turn, the Global
Sufficiency Fund, for the base year, is calculated for each CCAA as the difference between their
28The most significant amendment was in personal income tax, since following this agreement the only constraint
on potential rate changes by CCAAs was that such changes had to be progressive and retain the same number of
brackets as was the case for the Central Government. Until then, limits were set in terms of the variation in tax
payable brought about by the change. Regulatory powers in respect of VAT and excise duties were not granted,
however, except in the case of the tax on specific means of transport, where CCAAs have the power to change the
rate within certain limits, and that of the new tax on hydrocarbons.
29With the exceptions of health spending in the first three years in which the agreement was in force and certain
revenue-modulating rules.
30CCAAs keep the 100% collection of the hydrocarbon-oil retail sales, electricity tax, property and stamp duty
tax, tax of registration of motor vehicles, taxes on gaming, wealth tax and inheritance and gift tax.
31With the exception of the VAT, excise duties and electricity tax.
overall financing needs and the sum of their tax revenues and the transfer from the Guarantee Fund.
In subsequent years, the Guarantee Fund evolves with the growth rate of the Central Governments
tax revenues.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 41 DOCUMENTO OCASIONAL N.º 1807
II The fiscal rules framework affecting regional governments
From 1992, following the publication in March of Spain’s Convergence Programme, the so-called
Budgetary Consolidation Scenarios (BCS) were signed by the Central Government and each of the
CCAAs, further to bilateral negotiations, in which an specific maximum deficit and debt allowed for
each CCAA were determined. In March 1995, further to the revision of the Convergence Programme
in July 1994, the commitments contained in the BCS were also revised, and the ceilings for the
period 1995-1997 were specified. These were changed once again following the approval of the first
Stability and Growth Programme in December 1998.
The adoption by Spain of the Maastricht Treaty did not have any specific bearing on sub-
national governments’ fiscal rules. The subsequent milestone in the definition of the framework of
national fiscal rules took place in 2002. The budgetary stability law that came into force in 2002 set
a single limit for all CCAAs, though not in terms of debt but only in terms of the budget balance.
According to that law, CCAAs and local governments had to meet the principle of budgetary
stability, defined as the obligation to post a budget outturn that is in balance or surplus. This law
also defined the scheme of sanctions that may be imposed in the event of non-compliance to the
CCAAs.32 The law also provided that, in authorizing the arrangement of credit operations abroad
and the issuance of debt and any other resort to public credit, the Central Government shall bear
in mind compliance with the principle of budgetary stability.
A reform of the budgetary stability law was approved in May 2006, which entered into force on
1 January 2008, enabling the Central Government and CCAAs to adapt their deficit and surplus
targets to the economy’s cyclical position. Specifically, it allowed the CCAAs to run a deficit of 0.75
percent of GDP if economic growth was below a certain threshold33, to which a further 0.25 percent
of GDP might be added to finance increases in productive investment, including that earmarked
for research, development and innovation34. It likewise established that a significant portion (in
32Specifically, it states that if the CCAAs do not meet the obligations established under the law and if this leads,
in turn, to non-compliance with the obligations of the Stability and Growth Pact, the CCAAs shall assume, in the
portion attributable to them, the responsibilities arising from their conduct.
33These growth thresholds that determine the possibility of attaining a budget in deficit, in balance or in surplus
were set, for a period of three years, by the Council of Ministers, on the proposal of the Minister of Economy and
Finance and further to a report by the Council of Fiscal and Financial Policy of the Regional Governments and
the National Local Government Board. In particular, during this period of economic growth of less than 2% was
projected, the general government deficit could not exceed 1% of GDP (breaking down into a ceiling of 0.2% of
GDP for central government, 0.75% of GDP for the regional governments as a whole and 0.05% of GDP for large
municipalities). If economic growth was between 2% and 3%, general government should show a budget in balance
and, if growth exceeds 3%, a surplus should be run.
34In terms of the target-setting procedure, a report was first drawn up assessing the cyclical phase for the following
three years. On this basis, the BSL obliged the government to set, first, the budgetary stability target for the three
following years in the first half of each year, both for the general government sector as a whole and for each of the
agents comprising it; and, second, the State spending limit. Both should be approved by Parliament. Once approved,
the individual fiscal target for each regional government was set by means of bilateral negotiations between the
Ministry of Economy and Finance and the representatives of each regional government on the Fiscal and Financial
Policy Council.
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35 However, if the regional government had submitted the economic and financial plan to the Fiscal and Financial
Policy Council and the measures contained therein had been declared suitable by the Council, State authorization
for short-term credit operations that were not deemed to be external financing was not required.
36The budgetary stability and financial sustainability law (LOEFSP), for a more general description and analysis
of the 2012 budgetary stability law see Herna´ndez de Cos and Pe´rez (2013b).
37Both of which should be achieved following a transition period up to 2020.
38This is an important novelty of the new rule. The expenditure rule has been defined in a similar manner as the
one incorporated in the 2011 reform of the Stability and Growth Pact. In general terms the growth rate of public
spending should not exceed medium-term GDP growth unless it is accompanied by discretionary increases in public
revenue. The rule is applied not only to the Central Government but also to regions.
no case less than thirty percent) of investment programmes shall be financed with gross saving
of the CCAA in question, with only partial resort to debt being permitted. In addition to the
extension of the fiscal rules to the lower tiers of government, the BSL had a clause saying that the
State shall not take responsibility for the financing of the deficits or public debt of the lower levels
of government (no bail-out clause). As to the monitoring procedure, the Ministry of Economy
and Finance was required to submit a report to the government before 1 October each year on
the degree of compliance with the targets, and on real cyclical developments during the year and
deviations from the initial forecast. Should a risk of non-compliance be discerned, a warning may be
made to the government agent responsible. If such non-compliance involved a higher-than-targeted
deficit, the level of government in question was also required to draw up an economic and financial
rebalancing plan over a maximum term of three years. Lastly, it stipulated that, if a deviation
from targets prompts a breach of the Stability and Growth Pact, the tier of government involved
shall assume the attendant proportion of the responsibilities that should arise from the breach. In
addition, in the case of the regional governments, compliance shall be taken into account in the
States authorization of credit operations and debt issues. Specifically, if the failure to meet the
stability target takes the form of a greater-than targeted deficit, all the regional governments debt
operations shall require Central government authorization35.
Finally, a constitutional reform was approved in September 2011 that enshrined in the Constitu-
tion the obligation for all levels of government to adjust their conduct to the principle of budgetary
stability. The reform was followed by the approval of a new Law in 2012 36 that details that the
general government deficit in structural terms cannot exceed 0.4% of GDP, sets a limit on govern-
ment debt of 60% of GDP37 and an expenditure rule38. The 60% debt to GDP limit is distributed
as follows: 44% of GDP for the Central Government, 13% for all and each one of the CCAAs, and
3% of local governments. Moreover, in 2014 a new law added a maximum delay period for suppliers
payments of 30 days as a stability target.
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